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Contradictions of Capitalism and Their Ideological Counterparts: The 










Even though the concept of social capital has been around for a long time, it has recently 
gained a growing currency in academic literature on social and economic development. 
Numerous theorists, policy analysts, government officials and even international institutions 
such as the World Bank have attempted to theorize social capital as an indispensable prelude 
to economic development and democratization.  Contrary to this line of argumentation, there 
is in fact a weak positive correlation between social capital, economic development and a 
vibrant democracy.  The ascendancy of social capital lies in its potential to facilitate the 
consolidation of neo-liberal project. Social capital is conducive to externalizing the inherent 
contradictions of capitalist market economy, blurring the unequal power relations, and re-







«WKH FRQVHTXHQFHV RI RUJDQL]DWLRQ«VRFLDO FDSLWDO FDQ EH
negative for many members of a society, especially those who are 
UHODWLYHO\SRZHUOHVV7KH LGHDRIVRFLDOFDSLWDODVµFRPPXQLW\¶ LV
thoroughly conservative-populist (Harris and De Renzio1997: 
932). 
      
Global economic restructuring with its reproduction of uneven pattern of economic development 
has been accompanied by an exuberance of theoretical literature reflecting on economic 
development and democratization. Within the burgeoning theoretical interpretations dominating 
the discourse of economic revitalization, the concept of social capital has acquired a preponderant 
momentum. Numerous theorists, policy analysts and even institutions have utilized the concept of 
social capital to articulate a specific agenda that is geared to mystify unequal and asymmetrical 
power relations in world politics. For instance, the World Bank has integrated the concept of 
social capital in its operation as a newly discovered magical formula to galvanize economic 
development and enhance the democratization in developing and under-developed countries.  
Contrary to the intellectual endeavours intended to theorize social capital as a prerequisite to both 
economic growth and the democratization of political process, it can be demonstrated that there is 
in fact a weak positive correlation between social capital, economic development and a vibrant 
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democracy.  It is the thesis of this paper to argue that free market-oriented theorists and policy 
analysts have attempted to utilize the concept of social capital to obfuscate the intervention and 
strategies designed to secure the spread of neo-liberal project. Yet, this neo-liberal enterprise 
draws excessively on social capital as a conservative modality to justify re-shifting of social 
responsibilities to families and communities. The permeation of politico-economic discourse with 
the miracle of social capital is geared to blur structurally ingrained unequal power relations, 
externalize the inherent contradiction of capitalism and re-personalize social responsibility for 
economic outcomes that are congruent with the tenets of the neo-liberal project. 
 Prior to evaluating the alleged centrality and indispensability of social capital as a prelude 
to both economic development and the process of democratization, it is essential to provide a 
brief history of the trajectory of the concept of social capital and arguments that have been 
deployed to catapult it to a prestigious plateau within the discourse of development.  Even though 
the emergence of the concept of social capital is traceable to the early decades of the 20th century, 
most of those who have attempted to theorize social capital have highlighted the writings of 
Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam.  The notion of social capital first appeared 
LQ/\GD-XGVRQ+DQLIDQ¶VUHIOHFWLon on rural school community centers in the USA (Smith 2001).  
For Pierre Bourdieu, social capital refers to a network of social relationships that is socially 
constructed and is the product of collective or individual investment strategies (Bourdieu 
1986:249). According to Bourdieu, socio-economic inequality not only generates unequal 
resources in the pursuit of human capital but also breeds cultural and social capital that could be 
translated into economic capital (Bourdieu 1986). Therefore, privileged people utilize their social 
networks with other elites to enhance and consolidate their position within overall social relations 
of production (Bourdieu 1986).  According to James Coleman, even the marginalized layers in 
society can utilize the network of trust to enhance their conditions within the social structure by 
translating social capital in family and community into human capital (Coleman 1994). 
&ROHPDQ¶VGLVFXVVLRQRQWKHVRFLDOFRQWH[WRIHGXFDWLRQLQWKH86$SXVKHGWKHFRQFHSWRIVRFLDO
capital into the terrain of academic discourse on development (Smith 2001).   However, among 
various arguments that have been made to theorize social capital as a prerequisite stride to 
HFRQRPLF JURZWK DQG GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ 5REHUW 3XWQDP¶V DUJXPHQW KDV DFTXLUHG D JURZing 
currency. The inroad of social capital into the terrain of development discourse is also evident 
from its penetration into the language of the World Bank (Harriss and De Renzio 1997; Fine 
1999).  
 
3XWQDP¶V7KHRUL]DWLRQRI6RFLDO&DSLWDO   
Putman, who has conspicuously lamented the decline of associational life, choral societies and 
FLYLFDVVRFLDWLRQ LQ$PHULFDKDV LQWHUSUHWHGVRFLDOFDSLWDODV³ IHDWXUHVRIVRFLDORUJDQL]DWLRQV
such as networks, norms, trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperatiRQIRUPXWXDOEHQHILWV´
(Putnam 1993:35-:LWKLQ3XWQDP¶VWKHRUHWLFDOSDUDPHWHUVVRFLDOFDSLWDOKDVEHHQLGHQWLILHG
as an independent variable and the fundamental explanatory factor that accounts for the entire 
gamut of social, political and economic performance (Putzel 1997:940).   On the basis of his 
analysis of the overall performance of political and economic institutions in north- central and 
south Italy, Putnam argued that social capital plays a crucial role in both economic development 
and democratization process.  Based on his observation of a divergent path of socio-economic 
development that has marked Italian regions, Putnam identified social capital as the key 
explanatory factor for decoding the crux behind regional variations in Italy. It is 3XWQDP¶V
staunch conviction that the presence of civic association in north-central Italy is the fundamental 
force behind the economic prosperity of that region. Conversely, Putnam has imputed the 
economic stagnation in the south of Italy to the meagerness of its socio- cultural associations 
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(Putnam 1993a; Putnam 1993b).  Putnam has elevated social capital to the status of an 
independent variable that has an overarching impact on the economic and democratic successes 
 
Party politics or ideology makes little differences. Affluence and prosperity have no direct 
HIIHFW6RFLDOVWDELOLW\RUSROLWLFDOKDUPRQ\RUSRSXODWLRQPRYHPHQWDUHQRWWKHNH\«LQVWHDG
the engagement-voter turnout, newspaper readership, membership in choral societies and 




and the democratization of political life is contingent upon a vibrant civic engagement which 
itself necessitates the proliferation of socio-cultural organizations. However, as Margaret Levi has 
pointed out, Putnam has not clarified the mechanisms through which membership in social and 
cultural clubs can lead to civic engagement and a high quality government performance (Levi 
:KDWSXUSRUWVWRKDYHEHHQOXUNLQJEHQHDWK3XWQDP¶VWKHRUHWLFDOHGLILFHRIVRFLDOFDSLWDO
is an implicit assumption that neither reified power structures within overall relation of 
production nor the intrinsic proclivity of market forces to breed uneven patterns of economic 
development can be identified as fundamental factors behind differentiation in path of 
development that has marked the historical march of capitalism (Tarrow 1996:389-397).  It is also 
D ORJLFDO FRUROODU\ RI 3XWQDP¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW UHYHUVLQJ WKH LQYHWHUDWH SDWWHUQV RI HFRQRPLF
doldrums in the Third World counties and surmounting ghettoization compounded by mounting 
poverty in the developed countries necessitate stimulating citizen engagement at the community 
level (Putnam 1997).  As an alleged nostrum to economic development, Putnamian social capital 
tends to exculpate the crisis-ridden proclivity of market forces to engender the paradox of misery 
at the midst of prosperity.  It is GXH WR LWVH[WHUQDOL]DWLRQRIHFRQRPLFFDVXDOWLHV WKDW3XWQDP¶V
ostensibly appealing formula has found a mesmerizing place in the vocabulary of the World Bank 
ZKLFK KDV WULXPSKDQWO\ SURFODLPHG WKH GLVFRYHU\ RI VRFLDO FDSLWDO DV ³WKH PLVVLQJ OLQN WR
compleWHWKHHTXDWLRQ´+DUULVVDQG'H5HQ]LR+DUULV 
 3XWQDP¶V HFRORJLFDO DSSURDFK WR WKH VWXG\ RI SROLF\ SHUIRUPDQFH LPSOLHV D VKLIW RI
attention away from the internal structures of a given governmental institution to the condition of 
its existence (Putnam 1993b). This overt emphasis on the externalization of causality signals a 
theoretical challenge to the overriding premise of institutional perspectives that institutional 
structures shape the direction of public policy. According to this line of explanation, the forces 
behind the functionality or dysfunctionality of a given governmental institution lie within the 
UHDOPRIVRFLHW\ZKLFKDUHH[WHUQDOWRLQVWLWXWLRQVWKHPVHOYHV(YHQWKRXJK3XWQDP¶VHFRORJLFDO
explanation of governmental performance moves beyond institutional approaches that identify 
institution as the primary unit of analysis, it nonetheless remains unidirectional and non-circular. 
It neither dissects the underlying forces of social relations nor does it emphasize the structuring 
impacts of institutions on social capital. A comprehensive analysis of the ecology of political 
institutions necessitates taking into consideration the complexity of socio-economic environment 
within which institutions are established. By focusing almost exclusively on socio-cultural 
associations as given phenomena, Putnam has conspicuously dismissed exploitative inter-regional 
relations and patterns of domination and subordination within a given social environment. 
3XWQDP¶V DQDO\VLV RI WKH LQWHUDFWLRQ EHWween environment (civil society) and governmental 
institutions is geared to depict a consensual and non-conflictual picture of societal relations.  This 
idyllic illustration of society ignores the pugnacious and disruptive socio-political forces 
contained within the womb of civil society which is marked by unequal pattern of power relations 
(Mayer 2001). Prior to unraveling the congruity of social capital with the precepts of the neo-
liberal torrent and apprehending the rationale behind its penetration into the agenda of the World 
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Bank, it is crucial to demystify the asserted positive correlation between social capital and 
economic progress and democratization.  
 
Social Capital, Economic Development and Democratization 
Within the theoretical framework of Putnam, social capital is construed as conventional norms 
and codes of behaviour that have a potential influence to reshape formal  and informal rules  
governing  social interaction (Putzel 1997:940). What seems to have been overlooked by Putnam 
is a fact that the stocks of social capital interpreted as the sum of norms, values and orientations 
that provide a basis for political actions are not the debris of extraterrestrial collision which can 
be analyzed in abstraction independent of sociopolitical relations.  
 Despite the diversity of methodological approaches to the study of political culture, there 
is a unanimous consensus among the students of political culture that political values and 
orientation are also influenced by social, economic and political institutions (Stewart 1994; 
Rothstein 2000)). As Peter Evans has convincingly argued, state actions are not only crucial to 
spurring private cooperation but are also essential to function as a glue to consolidate a tenacious 
synergy between private and public spheres (Evans 1996:1119-1132). It is not a far-fetched claim 
to suggest that without active involvement of the state, private cooperation might not necessarily 
culminate in the translation of citizen sentiments into political objectives.  As Evans has pointed 
RXW ³$FWLYH FLWL]HQV DUH KDPVWUXQJ XQOHVV WKHLU JRYHUQPHQWV GHSHQGDEO\ VXSSO\ WKHP ZLWK WKH
LQSXWVWKDWWKH\FDQQRWSURGXFHRQWKHLURZQ´(YDQV 
 &RQWUDU\ WR 3XWQDP¶V WKHRUHWLFDO HQGHDYRXU WR GLPLQLVK WKH UROH RI SROLWLFDO SDUWLHV LQ
fostering civic engagement, social capital can in fact be constructed by politico-ideological 
struggles waged by political parties committed to raise the level of social consciousness and 
transmit public demand into political goods (Rothstein 2001:207-241). In his analysis of the 
socio-political development in Kerala, India, Patrick Heller has meticulously elucidated how the 
Communist Party in Kerala operated as a vehicle of class mobilization and cooperation which 
consequently paved the path for the establishment of a redistributive state (Heller 1996:1055-
1067).   Similarly, Rothstein has also demonstrated that institutionalization of social programs has 
been the main impetus behind the galvanization of social capital in Sweden (Rothstein 2000).  As 
James PutzHOKDVREVHUYHGRQHRI WKH FRQVSLFXRXVGHILFLHQFLHVRI3XWQDP¶V DQDO\VLVRI VRFLR-
economic development in Italy is his inadvertent or intentional omission of an irrefutable 
correlation between civicness and the presence of communist party (PCI) government which 
should have been a central explanatory element in his study (Putzel 1997:947). 
 Interpreted as an indispensable raw material for associational life, social capital is 
articulated by some theorists and institutions such as the World Bank as the cardinal contributor 
to economic and democratic development.  However, this articulation of capital fails to take into 
consideration the pernicious implications associated with social capital.  As James Putzel and 
Sidney Tarrow have pointed out, those who place their faith in social capital to surmount 
HFRQRPLF DQG GHPRFUDWLF LOOV IDLO WR DFNQRZOHGJH WKH ³GDUN VLGH ³RI VRFLDO FDSLWDO ZKLFK LV
manifest in its susceptibility to countenancing exclusionary and discriminatory patterns of 
behaviour which in fact constitute a threat to democracy.  Without the presence of an overarching 
political program that could deliberately utilize social capital for building a progressive 
movement, social capital can indeed become a basis for exclusionary and undemocratic practices 
(Putzel 1997:939-949; Tarrow 1996:89-397). More specifically, social capital has a potential to 
provide an auspicious ground for the conversion of politics into a monopoly of private club. In a 
small constituency and even small towns, the centre of political life can easily be translated into 
the political preserve of a small but organized group which can easily mobilize its resources to 
dominate the terrain of political processes.  Indeed, network of trust among members of a specific 
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ethnic group might lead to the crystallization of monopoly over the occupation of a specific sector 
of local labour market which is bound to blockade the intrusion of job-seekers of different 
ethnicities.  As Putzel has pointed out, by establishing a close-knit ethnically exclusive business 
community, Chinese merchants in South Asia have completely confined economic transition 
within their own community and despite their large stock of social capital are not necessarily 
strong adherents of democracy (Putzel 1997).  Furthermore, the exuberance of socio-cultural 
associations in the American past that Putnam has idealized as the bedrock of the glorious era of 
American democracy was in fact marked with egregious characteristics of racial segregation, 
political ostracism and social exclusion (Putzel 1997:946-947). The mere proliferation of socio-
cultural associations within a given social formation does not necessarily imply the ripeness of 
the political environment for enthroning democracy. Long before the theorization of social capital 
by Putnam as panacea for all socio-economic maladies facing societies, Pierre Bourdieu had 
already emphasized the potential of social capital for propagating undemocratic practices. It was 
%RXUGLHX¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW VRFLDO FDSLWDO DV D UHIOHFWLRQ RI LQVWitutionalized relationships and 
acquaintance is another effective network to secure privileges and advantages within a given 
society (Bourdieu 1986).   
 Just as social capital has the susceptibility to facilitate the ground for undemocratic 
patterns of political behaviours; civic engagement and an intense political participation are not 
also necessary prerequisites to economic growth as panegyrists of social capital tend to profess. 
The pervasiveness of exclusionary practices in the realm of politics and industrial relations does 
not necessarily constitute an impediment to the growth of capitalist economy.  Economic grow in 
(DVW$VLDQFRXQWULHVDQGWKHHPHUJHQFHRIWKHVHFRXQWULHVDVSURXG³WLJHUVRIFDSLWDOLVP´GLGQRW
require citizen participation but rather the exclusion of certain groups such as labour which was 
subject to repressive measures (Amsden 1989:1-21; Johnson1999:33-60).  It is unclear whether or 
not the strong economic measures that were taken by the Korean state to aggrandize its economic 
stature could have been possible to undertake under an atmosphere of political democracy 
(Amsden 1989:18).  As Evans has argued, embedded autonomy that is the insulation of 
bureaucracy from private influences emanating from civil society and a tenacious linkage 
between state institutions and business organizations functioned as the springboard for the East 
Asian economic take off (Evans1995:228-252).  
 Under the umbrella of capitalist social relations, an intense citizen participation in 
political processes might indeed retard the wheels of market forces.  As Mancur Olson has 
argued, private organizations which are constantly striving to further their interests are bound to 
engender pernicious ramifications for economic growth (Olson 1996:72-93).  Beyond certain 
thresholds, capitalist economy has an inherent logic to eschew enduring redistributive policies 
that accompany citizen engagement in political processes. As Patrick Heller has pointed out, the 
transformation of the state in Kerala into a redistributive entity was followed by a decline in 
economic growth which in turn coerced labour to make concession to capitalist classes.  The 
concession of labour to capital was in turn justified under the aegis of corporatism which was in 
fact a euphemistic expression of propitiating the working class and securing the subjugation of 
labour to the imperatives of capital (Heller 1996:105-107).  
 Active citizen participation in political process entails the pressure for the expansion of 
public frontiers and the accompanying public demand for redistributive measures to which 
capitalist market economy displays an intrinsic aversion. In other words, civic engagement waged 
for the democratization of socio-political structures has a potential to propel capitalism and 
democracy towards an explosive collision. Undoubtedly, it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
reiterate the protracted ideological controversy revolving around the relation between capitalism 
and democracy that has continued to prevail in the realm of political theory.  Since history has 
demonstrated the congruity of capitalist social relations with authoritarian political structures, it is 
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a theoretical blunder to suggest that democracy and capitalism have gone hand in hand as Putnam 
has asserted (Johnson1999: 23-60).  $V -DPHV SXW]HO KDV HOXFLGDWHG ³ZKDW KDV EHHQ JRRG IRU
FDSLWDOLVPDWJLYHQSRLQWVLQKLVWRU\«KDVQRWEHHQJRRGIRUGHPRFUDF\DQGYLFHYHUVD´3XW]HO
1997:941). What is certainly compatible with capitalism is the bourgeois democracy which has 
been used as a liturgical necessity to lubricate the rationalization of exploitative power relations.  
Under the aegis of liberal democracy which is used as a yardstick to only measure the principles 
and procedures of governing institutions, unequal distribution of capabilities are bound to 
reproduce themselves at the political level (Macpherson 1965; Manley 1983). Within the ambit of 
unequal relations of social forces inscribed into the structure of capitalist societies, mass political 
participation does not necessarily provide the ground for the employment of state power to 
challenge the imbalance of social relations whose roots lie in civil society. In capitalist societies, 
PDVVSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQSROLWLFDOSURFHVVPLJKWKDYHDQ LPSDFWRQ³WKHSROLWLFVRIVXSSRUW´GXULng 
HOHFWLRQV ZLWKRXW QHFHVVDULO\ LPSLQJLQJ RQ ³WKH SROLWLFV RI SRZHU´ EHWZHHQ HOHFWLRQV 6WHZDUW
1994:76).      
 The panegyrists of social capital have equated effective policy performance with 
democracy which is an overt attempt to glorify an elitist definition of democracy (Tarrow 1996: 
39-397). Under the atmosphere of a genuine and substantive democracy which necessitates a 
greater degree of equality and active citizen participation in decision making process, democracy 
will in fact transform itself into a destructive weapon to exorcise the spirit of capitalism 
(MacPherson 1979:93-115). To corroborate the inherent hostility of capitalism to democracy, it is 
not imperative to invoke socialist arguments. The pugnacity and indignation of capitalist social 
reODWLRQV WR GHPRFUDWLF YLUWXHV FDQ EH GHWHFWHG IURP 0LOWRQ )ULHGPDQ¶V FRQIHVVLRQ WR WKH
potential of democracy to extirpate the entire edifice of the capitalist order. During his speech in a 
forum arranged by the Fraser institute in 1986, while Friedman adulated capitalism as the bastion 
of freedom, he simultaneously referred to the incompatibility of democracy with the capitalist 
PDUNHW HFRQRP\ ³, DOVR EHOLHYH WKHUH LV HYLGHQFH WKDW D GHPRFUDWLF VRFLHW\ RQFH HVWDEOLVKHG
GHVWUR\VDIUHHHFRQRP\´FLWHGLQ Jeffery 1999: 25). 
 If there is no umbilical cord connecting social capital to economic development and a 
vibrant democracy, then what kinds of explanations can be made to apprehend mounting 
academic endeavours to raise the flag of social capital in the area of neo-liberal economic 
reconfiguration? The key to unravel the rationale behind the prevalence of the concept of social 
capital in the discourse of economic revitalization can be discerned from the analysis of John 
Harriss and Paolo De Renzio, who have accurately identified social capital popularized by 
Putnam as a concealed weapon of neo-conservatism (Harriss and De Renzio 1997:932). Harris 
and De Renzio have not expounded the ideological principles of neo-conservatism which 
provided the main impetus for the emergence of Reaganism and Thatcherism in the 1980s that 
triggered a wave of economic restructuring which has become a universal thrust around the globe. 
 
Neo-Liberalism and Social Capital   
 
Neo-conservatism is a contradictory and a janus-faced ideological project that has simultaneously 
attempted to resuscitate and combine the classical liberal theory of free market and the social 
traditionalism of classical conservatism. While the economic liberalism of neo-conservatism 
countenances rugged individualism and endorses greater latitude for the operation of market 
forces, its classical conservative component preaches moral values, stability and the preservation 
of family spirit and community cohesion (McBride and Shields 1993:24-41; Hoover and Plant 
International Journal of Criminology and Sociological Theory, Vol. 4, No. 2, December 2011, 718-732  
724 
 
1989:9-11; Gamble 1988:28-60). 1Neo-FRQVHUYDWLVP¶VDPDOJDPDWLRQRIWKHVHOHFWHGHOHPHQWVRI
these two traditions is intended to shift social responsibility for economic outcomes to family and 
community and therefore, depoliticize economic policies and justify the demand of market forces 
for socio-economic retrenchment (McBride and Shields 1993, 36-37). The emphasis of social 
traditional side of neo-conservatism on the role of family and community is geared to rationalize 
the re-personalization of social responsibility for economic outcomes that is demanded by its 
liberal component. While these two elements of neo-conservatism are contradictory in theory, 
they complement one another in practice.  Desmond King has meticulously elucidated the internal 
unity between these two components of neo-conservatism 
 
Liberalism is the source of New Right economic and political theories and policy objectives; 
conservatism provides a set of residual claims to cover the consequences of pursing liberal 
policies. For example, the liberal objective of reducing public welfare provision implies a 
traditional role for women and family; conservatism provides an ideology justifying such 
outcomes from public policy. (cited in McBride and Shields 1993: 37) 
 
 The concept of social capital fits neatly within this neo-conservative project since it 
emphasizes the significance of community and community-based associations in assuming social 
responsibility. It is along this line that social capital provides a justification for neo-conservatism 
to transfer the paternalistic roles of the state to private charity and community- based 
organizations which are reminiscent of the reign of laissez- faire social arrangements in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Harriss and De Renzio 1997: 932).  The vestiges of neo-
FRQVHUYDWLYHHWKRVLQWKHDOOHJHGPLUDFOHRIVRFLDOFDSLWDOFDQEHGHWHFWHGIURP3XWQDP¶VFDVXLVWLF
analysis of the inner city decay in American cities. Without taking into consideration the natural 
propensity of corporations to relocate their sites of production from one location to another in 
order to secure their rates of profit, Putnam has theorized the absence of social capital measured 
in the decline of associational life as the underlying force behind the pervasiveness of ghettos and 
socio-economic isolations that have become a striking dimension of the American cities (Putnam 
1993a; Putnam 2000).  The alleged decline in membership organizations that Putnam has 
identified as the main reason behind the inner-city decay in American cities has been question by 
Thed Skocpol.  According to Skocpol, changes in the structure and operation of community 
organizations should not be construed as a decline in membership organizations. These changes 
are manifestations of a shift from membership mobilization to centrally managed lobbying 
activities (Skocpol 2003: 176-178). Putnam has failed to account for the fact that when 
corporations dislodge their center of production and when middle class families move to sub-
urban areas in order to enjoy lower taxes, the deserted neighborhoods are doomed to lose their 
economic viability (Leo et la 1998:4-12). When a community is deprived from its material basis 
for economic survival, it will be destined to descend into a chaotic social disorder which Putnam 
has attributed to the absence of social capital (Leo et al 1998:4-12). By prescribing social capital 
as a panacea to vanquish the socio-economic ills which are in fact the natural products of market 
forces, the advocates of social capital have tacitly striven to externalize the endogenous and 
LQYHWHUDWH PDODLVH RI WKH FDSLWDOLVW PRGH RI SURGXFWLRQ 3XWQDP¶V JORULILFDWLRQ RI VRFLDO
associations and his enormous emphasis on the centrality of these private organizations to the life 
                                                 
1
  Numerous analysts have interchangeably employed the terms of neo-conservatism and neo-
liberalism as the ideological reflection of the New Right.  Even though the term neo-liberalism has become 
dominant in political discourse, the tenets of the New Right were first put into a political formula by the 
conservative governments on the both sides of the Atlantic. Despite their differences, these two terms are 
complementary and  are therefore  used interchangeably  in this paper. 
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of community might indicates a tacit countenance for  re-activitating church and private charity 
organizations to assume social welfare responsibility that had long ago been echoed by Milton 
Friedman (Friedman 1962).   
     As some authors have convincingly argued, a conservative flavor that is tailored to reinforce 
the interests of the dominant classes seems to have been injected in the conceptual structure of 
social capital (Levi 1996; Fine 2001). Even Eva Cox who still has a profound faith in the 
potential of the social capital to advance collectivity, has admitted that the concept of social 
capital has been appropriated by the right wing intellectuals to use for their own purposes (Cox 
2005).  Social capital has also found a place within the discourse of the Third Way social 
democracy (Meadowcroft and Pennington 2007; Scanlon 2005).  But as Christopher Scanlon has 
pointed out, the proponents of the Third Way have not demonstrated how social bonds and 
entrepreneurial culture embedded in their policy can be reconciled (Scanlon 2005).  John 
Meadowcroft and Mark Pennington have argued that the Third Way social democrats use social 
capital in order to justify state intervention in market activities.  According to Meadowcroft and 
3HQQLQJWRQFRQWUDU\WRVRFLDOGHPRFUDWV¶OLQHRIMXVWLILFDWLRn, social capital cannot be created by 
the state intervention. Market forces have the intrinsic capabilities to generate trust which is 
indispensable for functioning a healthy democratic society (Meadowcroft and Pennington 2007). 
Like Putnam, Meadowcroft and Pennington have nostalgia for the past when civic associations 
such as private and charitable organizations provided the needs of the poor.   Meadowcroft and 
Pennington seem to have provided an ambiguous and controversial picture of the appropriation of 
VRFLDO FDSLWDO E\ VRFLDO GHPRFUDWV &RQWUDU\ WR 0HDGRZFURIW DQG 3HQQLQJWRQ¶V OLQH RI
interpretation, the proponents of the Third way have in fact used social capital to rationalize the 
cooperation between labour and capital and therefore, lubricate the imposition of austerity 
PHDVXUHV ZKLFK DUH KHUDOGHG DV D ³SURJUHVVLYH FRPSHWLWLYHQHVV´  $V 'H[WHU :KLWHILHOG KDV
convincingly argued the Third way welfare state is not an alternative to neo-liberal model but 
PHUHO\DGLIIHUHQWPHWKRGRIDFKLHYLQJLW«:KLWHfield 2001:164).1   
Neo-liberalism should not be equated with the eradication of the welfare state. As James 
 Ferguson has pointed out public provision of social services and social payment continue to 
SOD\³DODUJHLPSRUWDQWDQGLQVRPHZD\VJURZLQJUROH´)HUJXVRQ7KHSDUDGLJPDWLF
shift to neo-liberalism should not be construed as a sign of the decline in the power of the state 
but only a change in its role.  In other words, the ascendancy of neo-liberalism should not be 
interpreted as an outULJKW DVVDXOW RQ WKH VWDWH LQ IDYRU RI PDUNHW EHFDXVH ³1HROLEHUDOLVP KDV
RSHUDWHGWKURXJKWKHLQVWLWXWLRQVRIWKHVWDWH´$OER+RZHYHUWKHRQJRLQJFKDQJHVLQ
the framework of social welfare provisions reflect a fundamental change in normative views on 
the proper relationship between the state and market economy.  This re-delineation of the line of 
social welfare responsibility between the state and market has culminated in the emergence of a 
new landscape within which the latter is praised as the most effective allocator of resources and 
provider of social security benefits.  This fundamental conversion in normative views on the 
interaction between the state and market implies a shift in the conception of the state as provider 
of social goods to the state as guarantor of the access to social goods that Neil Gilbert has 
GHVFULEHG DV WKH ³HQDEOLQJ VWDWH´  *LOEHUW   $V 'H[WHU :KLWHILHOG KDV REVHUYHG WKH
HQDEOLQJVWDWHUHIHUULQJWR³DPRGHORIJRYHUQPHQWLQZKLFKWKHVWDWHIDFLOLWDWHVDQGVupports but 
VHUYLFHVDUHSULPDULO\SURYLGHGE\SULYDWHDQGVRFLDOHFRQRP\´KDVDFTXLUHGDJURZLQJFXUUHQF\
in western societies (Whitefield 2001:84).       
                                                 
1
  Noel Castree has described neo-liberaOLVP DV ³D QHFHVVDU\ LOOXVLRQ´ IRU OHIWLVW DQDO\VWV DQG
theorists. As Graham Thomson has pointed out, neo-liberalism must be understood both as a politico-
HFRQRPLFRUJDQL]DWLRQWKDWHPSKDVL]HVPDUNHWDVWKHPRVWHIILFLHQWDOORFDWRURIUHVRXUFHVDQGD³PRGH of 
JRYHUQDQFHRILQVWLWXWLRQVDQGLQGLYLGXDOVWRZKLFKUHVSRQVLELOLW\LVFHQWUDO´7KRPVRQ 
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 The emerging normative changes on the role of the state as an enabling entity has   been 
echoed  by the OECD, which has called for a new orientation on social policy in which 
JRYHUQPHQW LV WR VHUYH  QRW DV WKH ³ SURYLGHU RI ODUJHVV¶ EXW ³ LQ SDUWQHUVKLS ZLWK DFWLYH VHOI-
sustaining  individuals (OECD 1994).   A radical version of the enabling state proclaimed as a 
PRWWRRI³WKHVWDWHVKRXOGQRW URZEXW VWHHU´KDVDOVRSHUPHDWHG WKH OH[LFRQRI WKH7KLUG:D\
politics of social democracy (Giddens 2000).  The emerging conceptualization of the state as an 
enabling entity implies re-orientation of the role of the state in the provisions of social protection.  
This re-orientation of the role of the state is reflected in pursuing market-centred social policy 
such as education, re-skilling and technological training that prepare the labour force to the 
demands of knowledge and technological-based new economy.  The enabling state is also 
manifested in erecting certain regulatory frameworks such as private arrangements for retirement 
benefits and welfare-to work schemes through which access to social goods is secured.  The 
empirical ramifications of cost containment and cost cutting associated with the change in the 
conception of the state as an enabling entity have manifested themselves along the main lines of 
the shift from universality to selectivity, recommodification of labour, downloading social 
responsibility to community and privatization of social protection.    
       It is not surprising that in an era of fiscal austerity, social capital has generated a climate of 
attraction among both right-wing think tanks and policy makers. The appeal of social capital to 
policy makers lies in its potential to rationalize the offloading of the social responsibility to 
individuals and community which after all is congruent with neo-liberal rescaling of the state 
responsibility.  Social capital reinforces the support for the neo-liberal led downward dispersion 
of state power to localities which is in fact geared to shift greater responsibility to local 
communities.  Under the aegis of neo-liberalism, re-scaling of state responsibility has manifested 
itself in various forms ranging from devolution to offloading and involving the voluntary and 
community-based organizations in the provision and delivery of social services (Shields and 
Evans 2002). Indeed, devolution, offloading, and mobilization of voluntary and community-based 
organizations in the delivery of social services have become major methods of the formation of 
neo-liberalism as a dominant socio-political project. Political decentralization and empowering 
community-based organizations purports to be ostensibly inspiring. However, neo-liberal inspired 
rescaling of state responsibility is conducive to obfuscate the real locus of power and therefore, 
diffuse state accountability.  More specifically, neo-liberal motivated shift of responsibly to 
voluntary and community-based organizations cumulatively known as the Third Sector  is bound 
to  marginalize the whole  agenda of redistributive policy that the state is anticipated to undertake  
in order to alleviate the adverse implications of market forces. Under the umbrella of mystified 
economic competition, states as the authors of economic globalization have found a pretext to 
externalize the sources of social disruption (Hirsch 1999:278-292).  By involving community-
based organizations in the provision and delivery of social services, the state has found ample 
latitude to diffuse its own social responsibility.  It is due to its concealed conceptual capacity to 
obfuscate the inherent proclivity of capitalism to breed economic distortion that the concept of 
social capital has easily permeated the agenda of the World Bank which itself has become an 
effective instrument in facilitating the inroads of neo-liberal project in the Third World countries 
(Rich 1996:305-313; Slater 1996:273-285; Caulfield 1996:270-335).  
 
The World Bank and Social Capital 
 
,QWKHZRUGVRIWKH:RUOG%DQNVRFLDOFDSLWDOUHIHUVWR³WKHLQVWLWXWLRQVUHODWLRQVKLSVDQGQRUPV
WKDWVKDSHWKHTXDOLW\DQGTXDQWLW\RIDVRFLHW\¶VVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQ6RFLDOFDSLWDOLs not just the 
sum of institutions which underpin a society-LWLVWKHJOXHWKDWKROGVWKHPWRJHWKHU´:RUOG%DQN
1999).  Within the parlance of the World Bank, social capital has thus been interpreted as 
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nurturing local associations and decentralizing political power which are exulted as a an essential 
prelude to narrowing the distance between governments and people , and therefore triggering 
economic take-off in underdeveloped countries (Harriss and De Renzio 1997: 929-930).  
According to the  World Bank , ³ LQFUHDVLQJHYLGHQFHVKRZVWKDWVRFLDOFRKHVLRQ LVFULWLFDO IRU
VRFLHW\WRSURVSHUHFRQRPLFDOO\DQGIRUGHYHORSPHQWWREHVXVWDLQDEOH´:RUOG%DQN,Q
OLQHZLWKWKH:RUOG%DQN¶VQDUUDWLRQVRFLDOFDSLWDOLVWKXVDQLQGLVSHQVDEOHFRPSRQHQWRIVRFLal 
and economic development since social networks and associational norms facilitate cooperation 
and coordination which are essential to community well-being. The World Bank has integrated 
the concept of social capital into its work in three areas; participation (involving community-
based organizations in local decision making process), policies (using local level social capital 
and participation to deliver projects), and partnerships (engaging in an array of partnerships with 
diverse actors working towards economic development and poverty reduction) (Bebbington et al, 
2006). To the World Bank, social capital appeals to all those crucial factors (education, health, 
accountability of political institutions and free market economy) which are central to economic 
and social development (World Bank 2001). It is the central conviction of the World Bank that 
social development as a key to economic development and democratization requires empowering 
people through galvanizing local associations and bringing them into local decision- making 
processes (Francis 2005).  
 Political decentralization and local community involvement in economic activities are 
glorified by the World Bank as an alleged catalyst to increase the scope for local initiatives and 
community control over the delivery of public services. It is a logical corollary of this line of 
interpretation that downward devolution of political power and community participation in public 
affairs is not only geared to broaden the basis for political action at the local level but is also 
conducive to aggrandizing the political efficacy of citizens to have greater control over political 
decision-making process that profoundly affects their lives.  Local participation is, therefore, 
envisaged as an indispensable factor to escape the black hole of economic backwardness in 
underdeveloped countries. This panorama of the path to economic development signifies 
recasting the relative significance of both structure and agency. The shift in analytical attention 
away from macro-levels to micro-levels (localities) implies the alleged centrality of bottom-up 
process of development as the key to open the gate of economic prosperity in the underdeveloped 
countries (Long 1990; Escobar 1995; Crush1995). By shifting the centre of attention to lower 
level of abstraction, this approach neglects the theorization of how micro-levels are structured by 
macro-levels at the first place. By drifting into local relativism as a reaction to neo-Marist 
structuralism, the proponents of bottom-up approach to economic development have in practice 
WHQGHG WRDEDQGRQ WKH WHUUDLQRISROLWLFDOHFRQRP\%RRWK :KDWFRQVWLWXWHV³0LFUR´ LV
LQWLPDWHO\GHSHQGHQWRQZKDWFRQVWLWXWHV³0DFUR´ $V,ODQ.DSRRUKDVSRLQWHGRXWH[FHVVLYH
accentuation on bottom-up DSSURDFKWRGHYHORSPHQWLVERXQGWRFXOPLQDWHLQWKH³IHWLVKL]DWLRQRI
SUDFWLFH´DQGWKH³LPSRYHULVKPHQWRIWKHRU\´.DSRRU3ODFLQJJUHDWHUHPSKDVLVRQ
the everyday life at the local level runs the risk of ignoring the structuring force of the macro-
scale that lies well beyond the reach of local action. Instead of regarding everyday practice as a 
point of entry into the understanding of how the Marco level is constituted, the proponents of 
bottom-up approach assume the everyday practices as a unified phenomena and set of social 
relations to the macro scale. 
 Despite the adulation of social capital by the World Bank as an incantational formula to 
surmount the social and economic misery in third world countries, the practical outcomes have 
been disDSSRLQWLQJDQGWKH:RUOG%DQNFRQWLQXHVWRXVH³WKLVPLVJXLGHGVWUDWHJ\´)LQH
,QWKHLUUHYLHZRIVWXGLHVFRQGXFWHGRQWKH:RUOG%DQN¶VH[KRUWDWLRQIRUGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQRIVWDWH
power and greater involvement of local communities as means to enhance governmental 
accountability and revitalize socio-economic underdevelopment in the Third World countries, 




of politico-economic objectives that had been anticipated (Harriss and De Renzio 1997:929-931). 
,Q KLV VWXG\ RQ WKH :RUOG %DQN¶V LQWHJUDWLRQ RI VRFLDO FDSLWDO LQWR LWV RSHUDWLRQ LQ 0H[LFR
Jonathan Fox has concluded that the World Bank in fact contributes to the dismantling of social 
capital more than to LWVFRQVWUXFWLRQ)R[  ,QKLV UHFHQWHYDOXDWLRQRI WKH:RUOG%DQN¶V
shift of operation from structural adjustment  to allocating investments  to anti-poverty projects in 
UXUDO0H[LFRDQG3KLOLSSLQHVLQV)R[KDVFRQFOXGHGWKDW³PRVWRIWKH:RUOG%DQN¶VUXUDO
SRUWIROLR LQ 0H[LFR LJQRUHG WKH SRWHQWLDO FRQWULEXWLRQ RI SRRU SHRSOH¶V VRFLDO FDSLWDO WR DQWL-
SRYHUW\HIIRUWV)R[DQGWKDWZKLOHLQ3KLOLSLQHV³SRRUSHRSOH¶VRUJDQL]DWLRQVZHUH
seen as potential instruments for project implePHQWDWLRQ«WKH\ ZHUH ODUJHO\ LJQRUHG  ZKHQ LW
FDPH WR SURMHFW GHVLJQ´ )R[   )XUWKHUPRUH LQ WKHLU VWXG\ RI :RUOG %DQN¶V VRFLDO
funds in Malawi and Zambia, Anju Vajja and Howard White have found that the nature of project 
participation was mainly shaped by the existing power relations and community members though 
were satisfied with the outcomes, passively participated in decision making process (Vajja and 
White 2008). 
 The adoption of the language of  social capital by the World Bank and its translation into 
the downward dispersion of state power and the necessity of community involvement in 
economic development is bound  to circumvent the real locus of power and therefore offload 
social responsibility to local communities which themselves are structurally subject to penetrative 
IRUFHVEH\RQGWKHLUUHDFK$V-RKQ+DUULVKDVSRLQWHGRXWWKH:RUOGEDQN¶VDWWHPSWWRKDUQHVV
social capital as a neutral technocratic framework to social changes is designed to blur the 
significance of power relations and, therefore,   depoliticize the process of development which 
itself is political in  nature  (Harris 2002).  In their analysis of the Silk Project, a multi-agency 
project funded bye the World Bank in Bangladesh that is aimed at increasing income and 
enhancing empowerment, David Lewis and Shameen Siddiqi have meticulously shed light on the 
potential of social capital to obfuscate the web of power relations that are crucial in determining 
the level of income and the nature of citizen empowerment 
 
 
The lens of social capital does not in the end tell us as much as we may need to know about 
the wider relationships of power, culture, and structure that contribute to or constrain both 
income generation and empowerment objectives (Lewis and Siddiqi 2006: 253).   
 
 The decentralization of political power and countenancing community involvement in 
economic development might have their own intrinsic virtues but they are not sufficient to 
conquer the chronic underdevelopment which has structured the subjugation of the Third World 
countries to advanced capitalist societies. The historical roots of underdevelopment in the Third 
Word countries have emanated from the logic of capital accumulation which has produced a 
simultaneous but contradictory process of development and underdevelopment that has structured 
a spatial hierarchy within the world economy (Frank 1966; Amin 1989; Wallerstein 1997). 
Indeed, the omission of global structural imbalances of power relations has become a defining 
characteristic of academic researches affiliated with the World Bank ( Grootaert and Van 
Bastelaer 2002). 
 
Conclusion         
 
As has been demonstrated throughout this paper, the theorization of social capital as the 
overriding explanatory factor for the entire range of economic and democratic development is not 
only controversial but is also desultory. In the absence of a deliberately and circumspectly 
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conducted political project through which social capital could be channeled into a propelling 
momentum for the democratization of socio-economic relations, social capital is prone to become 
a basis for undemocratic practices. Under the aegis of capitalist social relations, social capital is 
not a necessary precondition for economic development. On the contrary, capitalist economy can 
also flourish under a climate of social exclusion and authoritarian rule.  Indeed, active civic 
engagement launched for the democratization of political life has a potential to bring capitalism 
and democracy into a pugnacious confrontation which might trigger a seismic shocks that could 
sap the entire edifice of capitalist social relations. . 
 The rationale behind the deification of social capital as a panacea for economic 
revitalization emanates from its plausible but illusory justification to exonerate and externalize 
the congenital predilection of capitalism for propagating economic insecurity. By accentuating 
the indispensability of community involvement to economic development, social capital has 
given a golden opportunity to the proponents of neo-liberal project to rationalize the 
depoliticization of economic policies and personalization of social responsibility for economic 
outcomes.  It is due to its explanatory capacity to shift social responsibility to local communities 
and therefore obscure the structural imbalances of the world economy that social capital is 
ardently embraced by the World Bank which itself has functioned as an institutional mechanism 
to proselytize the Third World countries into the neo-liberal religion. Through the entrenchment 
of social capital in the terrain of socio-economic discourse, neo-liberalism has added another 
powerful weapon to its arsenal to conceal the sources of inveterate inequality of power relations 
which as a granite slab has provided the basis for protracted patterns of unequal economic 
development within as well as between nations. The ascendancy of social capital to the top 
agenda of economic development constitutes a theoretical raid on class analysis which is sine qua 
non to elucidating the ossified webs of unequal power relations that have historically marked the 
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